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No non-nuclear zone without Soviet arms cuts

ny suggestion of a nuclear-free zone in either Scandinavia or central Eu- is dismissed out of hand at Nato uarters in Brussels.

e West would be running much too s a risk, it is argued, unless the t Union were to thoroughly cut its s build-up.

e cuts would need to be guaranteed international controls.

n the Kola peninsula the Soviet on has the largest concentration of ed forces and firepower stationed in ngle area in modern history.

t would be worth considering a nuc- free only zone if the Soviet Union e prepared to embark on the largest mament programme in history.

here can clearly be no question of such thing, so the position will re- n unchanged in the Soviet Arctic, ich means that the Soviet general f, with its gigantic military concen- tion in the Kola peninsula, is pursu- a twofold objective.

One is to send up long-range aircraft h would halt shipping between h America and northern Nato Eu- in the event of hostilities, thus cut- off Europe from Canada and the ed States.

e other is to collapse the entire hern flank of Nato's defences, which d mean the end of the central sec- and the defence of Germany

h at first glance might appear of ount importance to Nato).

The latest news from the Soviet north hat Soviet long-range supersonic jets, Tupolev 22s, known in Nato par- e as Backfire bombers, have been ted rounding the North Cape and ing south-west into the Norwegian antic.

our of them were sighted and pho- aphed over international waters by wegian interceptors.

The Backfire bomber has a range of 0km, or 2,500 miles. Fuelled in mid- this can be extended to 8,000km.

They are equipped with nuclear mis- s with a range of 250km and are a dly danger to shipping between the ited States and northern Norway once y are based in the Kola peninsula.

They were not stationed there, but in probability they now are.

It is not enough for Nato to go nuclear-free. More is needed. Soviet anti-submarine vessels of the Krivak class have recently set out from Kola; they too are equipped with nuclear warheads capable of travelling 50km.

Any nuclear-free zone in northern Europe would have to mean an end to these ships being based in Arctic ports.

In the Kola peninsula, the Soviets have 185 submarines (70 nuclear); 11 cruisers; 60 destroyers, frigates and corvettes; 250 aircraft; 100 helicopters; and a complete parachute division, with 10 more in the Leningrad region. Within 10 days, four more divisions could be added. All would be equipped with SS-4 and SS-5 nuclear missiles. Then there is the Baltic Red Flag Fleet to the south of Scandinavia, with a further 75 submarines and 70 surface warships.

The Soviet Union would need to disarm heavily if more peaceful prospects were to be restored in Scandinavia, but one problem of any nuclear-free zone would still remain, as the Americans are quick to point out.

Even if the Soviet military concentration in the region were to be reduced, both the Backfire bombers and the SS-20 missiles, with a range of 4,800km and a payload of three nuclear warheads each, could be withdrawn behind an arms limitation zone in the Soviet Union but within striking distance of Scandinavia.

Arms limitation zones in Europe, whether northern or central, will always be threatened by the nuclear powers.

Hermann Bohle

(Der Tagesspiegel, 29 August 1981)

IN THIS ISSUE



Chancellor Schmidt with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem-Brundtland near Hamar, north of Oslo. (Photo: dpa)

Schmidt reassures Europeans on East-West relations

Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has warned Europe in an urgent appeal from Copenhagen not to be overwhelmed by anxiety.

After talks with Danish Premier Anker Jörgensen Herr Schmidt was bombarded at a press conference almost exclusively with anxious queries about nuclear armament.

"Europe," he said, "is too afraid." It was an absurdity to be more afraid of the United States than of the Soviet Union.

At the end of a two-day Scandinavian tour that took him to Norway and Denmark the Chancellor said he was still strongly in favour of all talks and ties that might lead to detente in East-West relations.

At the same time the Soviet Union was calling on other countries to disarm from an altogether unsuitable position of a unilateral arms build-up of its own.

Moscow was also, he said, proposing nuclear-free zones without in any way going into details. A freeze of current missile potential would in no way redress the balance in Europe.

Yet the deterrent potential of the two superpowers was enough to prevent ill-considered moves, so fearful talk was unwarranted, he said.

Herr Schmidt said he was not opposed to nuclear-free zones but before supporting proposals would need to have clarified what shape they were intended to take.

He was still not clear what the Soviet Union was prepared to offer in return for a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe and how far Moscow was willing to withdraw its nuclear weapons back into Soviet territory.

He stressed, as he had done in his talks with Norwegian Premier Gro Harlem Brundtland, that the US decision to go ahead with the manufacture of the neutron bomb gave no cause for undue anxiety.

It could only be stationed in Europe after unanimous approval by all Nato members, while in Germany the neutron device could only be based provided it was stationed in other Nato countries too. Yet he felt bound to say, and on this point Mrs Brundtland, Mr Jörgensen and he were fully agreed, that he had viewed the timing of the US decision with disquiet.

(Rheinische Post, 31 August 1981)

Preventing another war is Bonn's overriding preoccupation

The Second World War began 42 years ago when Germany invaded Poland. We know from Hitler himself that this was to be but the beginning of the conquest of fresh *Lebensraum* in the East.

The later war on the Soviet Union was a foregone conclusion even though, on 1 September 1939, Russia gave Germany backing and took its share of the spoils.

There can no longer by any discussion of who was to blame. The Germans were themselves to blame for destroying the Reich and their national unity.

But the war also brought to an end Europe's predominance in world affairs. The new superpowers went on to establish their respective domination over a war-torn continent.

They began to share out the world between the two of them.

Now, four decades and many smaller wars later, people are afraid of a major war again. The new world order is unstable and the United Nations remains wishful thinking.

The renewal of rivalry between the superpowers is threatening to nip in the bud the hopeful beginnings of cooperation between the blocs.

The Federal Republic of Germany, in common with the remainder of free Europe, depends on the Western alliance for its security. Nato is not an aggressive pact.


Its armament and military planning are no secret and geared to defence. The West also has political objectives that give priority to keeping the peace.

For Bonn this means forgoing a review of the results of the Second World War. It also means coming to terms with the division of Germany, probably for some time.

The Federal Republic is fulfilling its undertaking to ensure that war never again breaks out from German soil.

Siegfried Maruhn

(Westdeutsche Allgemeine, 31 August 1981)



■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Fundamental ties with America unchanged

Is it being anti-America not to trust implicitly, despite one's dislike of the arrogantly eccentric Colonel Gaddafi, in the US version of the aerial dogfight in the Gulf of Sirte off the Libyan coast?

Surely one is entitled to bear in mind the 1964 Tongking incident, a canard that led to America's unfortunate involvement in the tropical rain forests of Vietnam.

Is it being anti-American to regret the Reagan administration's striving for nuclear superiority and a position of strength and to give preference to the concept of balanced of power?

Is it being anti-American to differ from President Reagan's security adviser, Mr Allen, in thinking of arms control as more than a mere afterthought to arms modernisation?

Is it wrong to view arms control as a possible, indeed desirable alternative to arms modernisation and to want to talk before the arms build-up, not afterwards?

Is it being anti-American to continue under Ronald Reagan to share the view of his Republican predecessor, Mr Ford, that inflation and economic stagnation are America's foremost foes, not the Soviet Union and the Red Army?

Is it being anti-American to remind Defence Secretary Weinberger of the view he and Secretary of State Haig underwrote last March, along with Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher?

Economic stability and social justice, they agreed, were prerequisites if defence expenditure was to be maintained at the level envisaged.

Few concepts have been put to such mischievous use of late as anti-Americanism. Ex-President and Chancellor, Foriegn Minister and Opposition leader are lobbing it around as though it were a box of hand grenades.

Lesser mortals are even more liberal in their use of the term.

Yet what is needed is a more careful and considered approach so as to ensure that we do not end up with what no-one in this country can seriously want to happen.

No-one can possibly want the German-American friendship that has been built up over the years to go by the board. So what are the facts;

For one, anti-Americanism is not a mass phenomenon. Statistically it is virtually impossible to quantify. Pollsters who can be taken seriously all agree that affinities between Germans and Americans remain unchanged.

The popularity the United States enjoys among the German public has remained remarkably consistent over the past quarter century, standing at 40 per cent in 1957, 58 per cent in 1966 and 50 per cent in 1979.

In 1954 roughly 62 per cent of Germans questioned were in favour of being on good terms with the United States. In 1979 it was 63, in 1981 it was 65 per cent.

In September 1961 four Germans out of 10 were in favour of the military pact with Uncle Sam; in July 1980 the figure was 88 per cent.

So there can be no question of West Germans having undergone a fundamental change of view on ties with America. There is no such thing as wildfire anti-Americanism.

Go Home Yankee slogans are much more infrequent than they were in the 50s or 60s; nowhere are even ripe tomatoes lobbed at USIS centres, let alone Molotov cocktails.

There can be no gainsaying something entirely different, however. It is the elitist criticism of the United States by a minority of young people, academics, churchmen and ecologists.

In its origins this criticism is, if anything, unpolitical, not to say anti-political. It is primarily cultural revolutionary rather than intended to put paid to the Western alliance.

It combines three strands of motive:

- The first is an inescapable anti-modernism: opposition to the growth fetish, to the no-deposit, no-return society, to the technological civilisation, in short, to what is generally known as the American way of life.
- The second is anti-nuclearism. Supporters of the current movement are equally opposed to nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors. The United States as the leading nuclear power in both sectors naturally comes under fire in both.
- The third is pacifism, and as Willy Brandt recently remarked, the world has experienced worse Germans than the pacifist variety.

The peace movement is by no means alone in feeling that the endless arms race in East and West vs an appalling waste of money.

With the cash invested in the arms bill the world could be made a better place to live and love in.

Many people are indignant at the very idea of welfare spending cuts merely to boost defence spending.

They are also mistrustful of disarmament talks that start by negotiating fresh arms build-up ceilings.

It is only fair to add that this view is shared to some extent even by the majority of the German public who are willing to defend the West, to stand by Nato and to back growth policies.

Fifty-three per cent may be in favour of the Nato arms modernisation resolution but 20 per cent are not and a further 27 per cent are undecided.

And 48 per cent say what matters is to prevent war (whereas 27 per cent give priority to defending democracy, even at the price of nuclear warfare, and 25 per cent feel the choice is impossible).

These views can be mistakenly interpreted as anti-Americanism (and often are). Besides, they cannot be denied. Opinions differ and diverge between the United States and Europe at government level too.

Yet they again have nothing to do with anti-Americanism. They are merely the result of international political developments that have put paid to the erstwhile transatlantic consensus.

Agreement can no longer be prescribed from Washington; it has to be negotiated in painstaking detail. Interests no longer coincide in any case; identity can only be achieved as a result of consultation and concerted action.

Views have always differed in this way on occasion. Clashes between Europe and America are nothing new.

On economic issues relations ceased to be *gemütlich* in the early 70s, while disputes have recurred every few years with regularity on strategy and armament.

The world beyond Europe gave cause for friction back in the days of the Suez crisis, in Algeria and in Vietnam, and it did so continually.

It was, perhaps, worst under President Carter, whose "government by epilepsy" drove Europeans distraught. But there is no shortage of potential for friction under President Reagan either.

To begin with, the tenor of public opinion in America and Western Europe differs radically. In the New World it is ideological, braggart, aimed at calculated confrontation; in the Old World pragmatical, moderate and ready to compromise.

These differing basic sentiments lead to different political mandates, which lead in their turn to different political objectives.

This is particularly true of East-West ties. Europe will not shirk confrontation if the Soviet Union insists on it, but otherwise it would prepare to keep the cooperation option open.

It alone holds forth any prospect of an end to the division of Europe, which is one of the reasons why Europe attaches importance to talks between the superpowers being continued especially when times are hard.

Above all, Europe is in favour of continuation of the arms control dialogue between Moscow and Washington; it regrets that Washington invariably creates the impression of dragging its feet.

America repeatedly seems to have a policy on armament but none on disarmament, while Europe is not enamoured of the idea of allowing the Soviet Union to arm itself to death.

It is also unenthusiastic about viewing the Third World primarily as an arena in which the great powers can act out their rivalry.

In Europe eyes the southern hemisphere must be helped for its own sake. Europeans continue to consider the South's problems as largely domestic rather than geopolitical.

This is why, as in El Salvador, they prefer to back reform rather than the military.

These are not all views held specifically by the Bonn government; they are assessments shared by most of Europe, which also harbours suspicions that not it but America has lost its nerve.

Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said not long ago that he did not have an inferiority complex where the Soviet Union was concerned. Does President Reagan have one?

He talks about Soviet communism being on the brink of collapse but he acts as though the Russians were 10 feet tall.

Not everything is anti that is critical of America.

Unquestioning, uncomplaining subordination has been replaced by a critical solidarity that alone makes true partnership possible.

Europe has ideas and interests of its own that are not simply the result of *sacro egoismo* but could often be an essential and necessary contribution towards US thought and the definition of US interests.

In other words, what Europe thinks could have an important part to play in an integrated Western policy.

Keeping quiet and getting on with the job come what may is not the only token of a loyal ally. Holding the opposite view can at times be the best bet.

It need not be sheer and unadulterated anti-Americanism, so let us be careful before using the convenient tag of anti-Americanism.

Theo Sommer

(Die Zeit, 28 August 1981)

Nato waits fo[r] Spain with open arms

DER TAGESSPIEG[EL]

Spain will probably join Nato ...
it gains admission to the E...
Community. Access to the Europ...
is being delayed by agricultural ...
ciaries of the EEC, whereas al...
countries would be likely to w...
Spain as a newcomer to the Nor...
lantic pact.

Madrid may, of course, hope th...
joining Nato it will be removing ...
of the obstacles to its accession t...
Common Market.

The Spanish parliamentary deb...
an application to join Nato shoul...
by the end of the month. The Co...
of State has advised the governme...
have the Cortes deal with the issu...

This recommendation is in kee...
with the government's view, where...
Communists and Socialists have ...
for a referendum and threatened ...
meetings against the membership ...

The argument that Spain wou...
dragged into any East-West clash ...
Nato member pulls only limited w...
By its treaty terms Nato is a defen...
liance that has fulfilled its role i...
rope, that of keeping the peac...
means of joint deterrence, for ov...
years.

Besides, Spain has leased ei...
bases go the United States so it i...
dy included in both Western d...
planning and the range of the new ...
dium-range Soviet missiles.

So Soviet criticism is mistaken in ...
serting that if Spain were to join N...
the military balance in Europe would...
seriously upset.

For some time Moscow has sought ...
stymie any attempt by Spain to ...
Nato by its so-called disarmament ...
posal to freeze the membership of N...
and the Warsaw Pact.

Spain's bid to join Nato is in ...
more significant politically than mi...
ly.

The Spanish armed forces, steep...
Franco's traditions and designed ...
for domestic oppression than for d...
ding the country against an external ...
gressor, would be subjected to ...
some structural change by virtu...
being obliged to modernise and to ...
grate in a democratic defence allian...

This would make it easier to ...
company with reactionary Franco ...
rals and consolidate democracy in S...

(Der Tagesspiegel, 28 Augu[st 1981])

The German Tribun[e]

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HOME AFFAIRS

SPD politicians manoeuvre to find a consensus on defence issues

...re are no extremes in the security
...licy debate within the Parliamen-
...D.
...ng SPD politicians in the discus-
...erate on the basis of fixed values.
... questions the West's military
... Adequate conventional and
...armament is seen as the guaran-
... security. Arms control and dis-
...nt measures are not sought in il-
... unilateral actions but in the full
...s of the complicated web of
...st interdependence.
... applies to virtually all SPD po-
..., ranging from Helmut Schmidt
...n Bahr all the way to Erhard Ep-

... individual approaches vary widely.
...ews of Eppler, for example, can-
... bridled. He even goes so far as to
...d that the Social Democrats admit
...they have at times pursued the
... policy.
..., whose views on many issues
...de with Eppler's, has geared his
...m and suggestions to making use
... political scope of action, which he
...ng to enlarge.
...s is where he is superior to Eppler.
...idt, on the other hand, has largely
...sted his scope of action — with
...d to both Euro-missiles and the ne-
... weapon.
...s the head of the coalition govern-
...t, he can now only hope for a mi-
... in 1983, and that a further stiffen-
... the Soviet-American confronta-
...vill not force him to make good
...eat to resign.
...s outlines the situation in which
...SPD is trying to articulate its "new
... movement".
...t it will hardly succeed if it does
... progress beyond a series of discus-
... under the heading of "peace for-
... which is to get under way soon at
...rty's Bonn headquarters.
...h a discussion could only succeed
... party were prepared publicly to air
... differences of opinion within its
... and to touch upon taboos in the
....
...ce researcher Horst Afheldt has
...d down his invitation to the forum
...o doubts as to the party's genuine-
... seeking a true discussion.
...he sees it, the SPD has in the past
...ars shirked any true and decision-
...ing discussion on alternatives to
...rms race.
...er Glotz replied to Afheldt in a
... in which he regretted the peace
...rcher's decision to turn down the
...ation. Glotz conceded in his letter
... there has been discord between
... who bear government responsibil-
...d the Social Democratic party with
...ogramme. He added: "But this is
... surprising in a coalition govern-
....
...tz also stressed that nobody can
...de a non-nuclear state like the
...al Republic of Germany with as
... scope of action within the Al-
...s can Chancellor Schmidt.
...is dialogue between Afheldt and
... is a pretty good reflection of the
... dilemma as a whole. The difference
...een Afheldt's accusation that the
... is a missile party rather than a
... party and Glotz's excuse for this
...e grounds that a coalition govern-
...t is subject to certain concessions

Süddeutsche Zeitung

shows the gap that has to be bridged in the SPD if it is to regain that state of consciousness that marked its former security policy.

• And this, in turn, raises the question as to the survival of the Social-Liberal coalition.

In his book *Ways out of Danger*, Eppler, who is still a presidium member of his party, has expressly praised the Chancellor's attempts to promote a dialogue between the superpowers. But he has also stressed that Western Europe must try to gain more scope of action, saying:

"Moscow must be made to realise that any sabre-rattling will fuse Western Europe into a firm bloc with the USA. And Washington must be made to realise that any attempt to outpace the enemy in the arms race will engender stiff opposition in Western Europe."

So where does his position differ from that of Egon Bahr?

In an article published in the SPD party organ *Vorwärts*, Bahr writes about America's decision to build the neutron weapon: "The nuclear problems have been caused by the nuclear powers and not by those who, in an era of self determination, want to have more say than they have hitherto had. We know our limits and we know what power means; but where our own territory is concerned, we want to have a say — and this is no presumption but out inalienable right and, indeed, duty. It is, after all, our existence that is at stake."

Bahr's arguments have the advantage of formulating Social Democratic policy in an area where much of the peace movement (CDU man Mertes calls it "angst movement") says that it is non-existent.

Seizing upon a remark by US Secretary of Defence Weinberger, who pointed to the possibility of a rapid deployment of neutron warheads from America to Europe, Bahr went into the even more important issue of new American medium-range missiles, saying: "Everybody knows that the SPD is looking for a 'zero solution'.

"Here, America's technical capability is of major importance, i.e. the capability of transporting American-made missiles to Europe should the Soviet Union bring its SS-20, now stationed in Asia, far enough West to be able to target them on Western Europe. Approximately the same level of security also calls for a similar deployment time for weaponry should this become necessary."

Bahr has thus probably contributed more to the issue of peace than the envisaged series of discussions will ever do.

Anybody who wants to prevent an additional arms buildup must seek ways and means that will enable the West to come up with an answer to Eastern demands and thus continue the dialogue.

Close to three years ago, the Soviet Union said it would reduce the number of its medium-range missiles (by shifting them further East or scrapping them) if the West did not station additional missiles in Europe.

Brezhnev elaborated on and reiterated this proposals this year. But the West rejected it, saying that the Soviet Union could bring its withdrawn missiles back at any given moment.

Bahr's remark about the "approximately equal deployment time" can get the discussion off the ground, though it is unlikely that the entrenched positions of the Soviet Union and the United States will become more flexible as a result.

Some of the proposals made by the churches seem to go too far for the SPD politicians taking part in the discussion. This applies even to the suggested model of a "gradual disarmament" that would begin with unilateral disarmament measures and, as suggested by a Protestant group, continue over a "considerable period of time" even if the response of the other side is unsatisfactory or fails to materialise altogether.

The proponents of this model say that this would not affect our defence potential and the minimum deterrent. The aim of the proposal is to create a basis for talks that would hold a promise of success.

Hans Koschnick, chairman of the Security Committee of the SPD Executive Board, has welcomed the proposal, but his comments on it were cautious.

He would like to see such unilateral goodwill measures limited to a period immediately preceding negotiations. But he sees little likelihood of this materialising for lack of initiative on both sides. He also wants every step made in this direction by one side to be matched by the other.

With a view to the problems surrounding medium-range missiles, Koschnick rejects such gradual disarmament on the grounds that, given today's situation, any return to the bargaining table is preferable to such unilateral measures. He explained his views in a letter to the protagonists of the proposals.

The same letter also gives the reason for the limitation of Social Democratic initiatives on the issue: "Those who demand that the federal government reject the stationing of American Euro-missiles must realise that it was the Nato partners themselves who pressed America to boost its missile potential."

Koschnick is right: it was Helmut Schmidt who publicly pointed to the European missile gap during a visit to London on 2 October 1977.

Martin E. Süsskind

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 August 1981)


The advantages of using the Moscow connection well

After the general election last year, *Pravda* quoted Baden-Würtemberg's Prime Minister Lothar Späth and Lower Saxony's Prime Minister Ernst Albrecht as saying that the CDU/CSU opposition in Bonn maintained virtually no contacts with the East Bloc and the Soviet Union in particular. It was quite prepared to leave this to the government.

Erhard Eppler (SPD) has just gone to Moscow for political talks and is thus (after Egon Bahr and Willy Brandt) yet another SPD politician to have visited that city within a short time.

Like his fellow party members, he criticised parts of Washington's policy and so provided himself with sound credentials for the Kremlin. It is doubtful whether this was wise.

Efforts by top SPD politicians such as Brandt, Bahr and Eppler to milk the Kremlin for information on Soviet military and strategic intentions (as the Saarland's SPD Executive Board member Oskar Lafontaine recently did in Washington) and to gain a personal impression of Soviet views are naturally useful.



It is regrettable that all these trips by SPD politicians meet with acid comments from the Opposition, usually by Alois Mertes, the chairman of the CDU/CSU Foreign Affairs Workshop.

Mertes is a former diplomat who had to leave Moscow with "some haste".

It is worth remembering that, before the election, CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss made a bid for a Russian visa and an appointment with Brezhnev and was turned down. The Soviets did not want to improve his election chances by upgrading him on an international scale.

Soviet sources now say that, apart from this special situation, they naturally consider contacts with the Opposition desirable because of the possibility that Moscow will one day have to negotiate with a conservative government in Bonn.

Two CDU politicians, Rainer Barzel and Walter Leisler Kiep have in the past speculated on the shape *Ostpolitik* would take on if the CDU/CSU formed a government — be it alone or with a coalition partner.

The CDU/CSU, *Pravda* once wrote, was not only against the East Bloc treaties as negotiated by Bahr and Brandt but also against the signing of the Helsinki Accords. In fact, according to *Pravda* the conservatives even deny the advantages of arms talks between the two superpowers.

Pravda's exaggerated formulation that put the "CDU/CSU somewhere between cold war and détente" is plainly untrue, says Barzel.

Like the government, the Opposition operates on the basis of current realities and not only wants to uphold the East Bloc treaties but intends to use them as an instrument of German policies.

It would be good if the troika Brandt-Bahr-Eppler were not left to take the initiative (like in the early 1970s) and if the CDU/CSU were to engage in active politics and point out the alternatives.

The CDU/CSU should also be interested in good relations (including economic ones) with the Soviet Union in case of a change of government in Bonn.

It would be a pity to lose all the positive things that have come in the wake of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.

Peter Seidlitz

(Kieler Nachrichten, 21 August 1981)

THE LAW

Police chief who rose through the ranks

Heinrich Boge, 52, head of the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BKA), in Wiesbaden, has gained everybody's respect since he assumed office in the spring.

He was formerly Hanover's chief of police and head of the Police Department at Bonn's Ministry of the Interior.

Boge was no unknown quantity to the BKA's staff of 3,500 when he assumed the presidency of Germany's most demanding security agency. He has been engaged in police work for the past 32 years, starting as a cop on the beat who acquired a law degree in his spare time, gradually rising through the ranks.

Of course he had many contacts with the BKA during his police work, particularly when he was at the Bonn Interior Ministry. There, the BKA was part of his responsibilities.

He is said to have had frequent differences of opinion and clashes with his predecessor at the BKA, Horst Herold, when the feathers flew.

At the time, insiders said that while Boge as a policeman recognised Herold's expertise, he did not share his visionary belief in computers.

The fact is that Boge did not assume his job at the BKA with the intention of realising any "visions".

In the first two months he was said to be "studying the setup." This was followed by a period in which his immediate subordinates said "the boss now has a picture" and, finally, the word was that "he's settled in."

Visitors find that everything is as it was. But is it?

True, there have been no visible changes. The distribution of tasks, the internal setup and the emphasis in the bureau's work have remained the same.

Such changes would in any event not have been within *his* authority since they could in some cases not be instituted without going through the Bundestag.

Yet there have been changes that are not immediately recognisable. The staff, for instance, have noted with satisfaction that the new boss is "a good listener." He is said to be pleasant to deal with and knows how to handle people.

This is probably due to the fact that, unlike Herold, Boge speaks the language of the cop.

Herold took over the job to realise his visions of an efficient criminal investigation centre. He thus decided what he wanted from the very beginning and most of his staff went along with him.

Even his worst opponents don't deny that he was successful. It is largely due to his work that the BKA today ranks among the top criminal investigation bureaus in the world.

Boge is entirely different. He took over a functioning apparatus with the intention of ushering in a phase of consolidation.

Following a dramatic development of the BKA into its present crime-busting efficiency there was clearly a need for this.

Heavy criticism has been levelled at the bureau over its enormous powers and due to the simple fact that federal coffers are no longer bursting with cash as they once were.

There have also been changes in the BKA's relations with the police forces in the individual states. One senior BKA man: "In the old days we asked the state prime ministers to come and see us; now the boss goes to them and their police headquarters."

The states clearly appreciate this new attitude. Boge's visits to the state capitals, his manner and his expertise earn him respect. A senior North Rhine-Westphalia police officer: "He's well informed and his time of learning the ropes is clearly over. He has now actually taken charge to the point where nobody can pull the wool over his eyes."

Boge enjoys the same respect in his former bailiwick, the Bonn Interior Ministry. Except that now the roles are reversed.

Before he became president of the BKA he occasionally had to turn down the bureau's requests. Now, it is he who has to fight it out with Bonn's bureaucracy.


"And he does exactly that in a very matter-of-fact and competent manner," says a senior Interior Ministry official.

Whenever differences arise, Boge calls a spade a spade and tries to settle them in as businesslike a manner as possible.

Patience, perseverance and frankness are his most conspicuous qualities.

Frequently he is tough when it comes to settling matters of principle.

All this has prompted security experts to regard Boge as the ideal successor to Herold whose merits in building up the BKA remain indisputable.


Heinrich Boge ... calls a spade [...]
(Photo: [...])

"Herold," says one of his former [...] "was the right man in the right [...] that time. But Boge is the right [...] today's conditions at the bureau"

The visionary Herold could [...] thusiasm by his convincing [...] eloquence.

For instance: when the Bonn [...] Ministry appointed Günther [...] vice-president of the BKA it was [...] rally assumed that he was appoi[...] the post as a watchdog.

But a year later nobody [...] the watchdog role anymore and [...] became the most enthusiastic of [...] followers, fighting it out on his [...] with the Bonn bureaucracy.

He had, as one wit put it, "[...] fully heroldised."

It is unlikely that the same [...] said of Heinrich Boge. But then, [...] not Herold's staff member but [...] cessor.

Günther [...]
(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 21 August [...])

What makes a terrorist? Study looks at some backgrounds

There have been all sorts of theories why people become terrorists. Despite the earnest efforts to shed light on personal and political questions, not much conclusive evidence has been unearthed.

There have been no shortage of interpretations. Excursions into pseudo-psychology and sociology abounded.

The cliches included: the idle son of rich parents; the girl brought up in an authoritarian home; the student overfed on state subsidies; and the sexually frustrated women's libber.

What scientific explanations were put forward were not reliable enough because there wasn't enough solid information available.

Now the Bonn Ministry of Justice has produced a study to fill some information gaps.

The study is not 100 per cent scientifically authoritative, but it does provide facts.

It goes under the cumbersome name of "Social-Biographic Traits of Left Wing Terrorists and their Supporters", and is based on the trial records of 209 terrorists who were convicted between January 1971 and November 1980.

The study confirms the impression that many of the terrorists come from relatively well-to-do families and have a high level of education: 36 per cent came from the upper and 23 per cent from the lower social classes.

These class-related data have only been established for about half the convicts.

The educational level is high both in relation to the population as a whole and to other criminals: at least 36 per cent were university students at the time of their crimes and another 28 per cent had graduated from other post-secondary schools.

But 24 per cent had only elementary schooling and another 12 per cent dropped out of post-secondary schools.

20 per cent were self-employed or they were fairly high-ranking white collar workers or civil servants; 10 per cent were small tradesmen or middle level white collar workers and civil servants; 26 per cent were low level clerks and skilled and unskilled blue collar workers.

The rest were secondary school or university students or had no occupation at all.

Most of the convicts (67 per cent) were single, 20 per cent were married and 13 per cent divorced, widowed or separated.

The widespread view that terrorists had no previous criminal record has been proved wrong: 26 per cent had been sentenced before for crimes unrelated to terrorism, 11 per cent had terrorist convictions and 63 per cent had no record.

Another supposition that has been proved wrong concerns the proportion of women: only 26 per cent of those under review are women.

An interesting aspect of the study is the breakdown into the types of crimes: only about 25 per cent of the terrorist convicts were sentenced for attacks on people or objects.

By far the largest proportion received their sentences for "group-related acts", in other words, for acts that led to the development or maintenance of a terrorist group or for crimes committed to supply such groups, such as robbery, car theft, the purchase of weapons, forgery of identification papers, etc.

The mere membership in a criminal or terrorist organisation also belongs in this category.

Thirty per cent of the convicts were sentenced for supporting terrorist groups by giving them shelter or letting them use their cars or writing terrorist graffiti or distributing terrorist leaflets.

The study stresses that these classifications have nothing to do with the severity of the crimes.

Taking only the more severe crimes, it transpires that 10 per cent were sentenced for homicide, 14 per cent for arson, bombings, etc. and 15 per cent for robbery or blackmail.

The study terms it "significant" that only one-third of those sentenced for simple or multiple homicide committed these acts with the intention of assassinating a specific person.

Two-thirds of these crimes were directed against groups (such as the police force), mostly to escape arrest.

"While this does not minimise the heinousness of homicide, it sheds more light on the circumstances under which terrorists are prepared to kill," says the study.

Justice Ministry experts have [...] plified these facts with a cautious [...] pretation: German terrorism has its [...] in the student movement.

"Initially, it was academics wh[o be]lieved that the political change [...] thought necessary could only be [...] through violence. From there, the [...] ist movement spread to other gro[ups ...] the public. And it is here that the [...] logical reasoning behind terrori[sm ...] might have lost its importance."

According to the study, ter[rorism ...] shows a certain similarity with the [de]velopment of drug addiction.

The findings suggest that the [...] biographical traits should be inte[rpreted] as indications of relatively we[ak ...] with the social institutions of our [...] society such as family and occupa[tion].

But this constellation does not [neces]sarily indicate an inclination to c[ommit] crimes. It only marks the transi[tion ...] adulthood.

This condition, which youth re[searchers] terms "status uncertainty", is fre[quently] coupled with feelings of insecu[rity ...] personal insignificance as well a[s ...] search for orientation patterns [...] with the need to lean on somethi[ng].

If young people in this situa[tion are] exposed to additional stress and a [...] failure at school or in vocational [...] or failure in the search for [...] problems in the parental home [...] which is experienced as rejectio[n ...] become more inclined to join [...] groups that offer (pseudo) [...] for such insecurities and [...] ("the blame rests with [...] show ways of overcoming [...] tively fighting against [...]

[...] (Stuttgarter Zeitung [...])

PEOPLE IN POLITICS

Bonn's man in East Berlin puts the accent on informality

[...] letter by Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to GDR leader Erich Hon[ecker] and a working visit by Klaus Böl[ling] to the Chancellor's holiday home [at] Brahmsee in Schleswig-Holstein [rem]ind one how times have changed for Bölling.

[A] year ago he was chief government [spok]esman in Bonn and had to pour oil [on] the troubled waters of upset over the [...]ed postponement of the Chancellor's visit to the GDR.

[N]ow, as Bonn's permanent representa[tive] in East Berlin, he himself has the [task] of preparing for the meeting with SED leader and State Council [chair]man.

[In] June 1974, when Klaus Bölling [wa]s appointed chief government spokes[m]an in Bonn by Chancellor Schmidt, [the] Chancellor mused about his future [pro]spects.

["]No-one who has been chief spokes[man] for the Federal government can fail [to] go on to become either an ambassa[dor] or a member of the Bundestag," [He]rr Schmidt said.

"If he is unlucky he will only become [an] ambassador." This turned out to be [a]ll that became of Klaus Bölling, who as [B]onn's man in East Berlin enjoys in German no more than the status of permanent representative.

But Herr Bölling does not feel he has [be]en unlucky in any way. Taking over from Günter Gaus as Bonn's man in East Berlin was his personal preference.

After more than seven years in Bonn he has now spent over seven months in the GDR without much being seen or heard of him, which is a far cry from his previous constant appearances on German TV.

But this in no way upsets him: "I am quite happy no longer having to dance at so many weddings."

For years as government spokesman his job was to put across the Chancellor's policy, a task he performed so well that, as a caustic commentator recently put it, it often came over as better than it really was.


Now he prefers to say nothing, despite a long waiting list of would-be interviewers, and this too is much to the liking of Chancellor Schmidt.

"I should not like to start jawboning at this stage of the proceedings," he says.

What he would like is to ensure that the meeting between Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker is not talked into failure before it even takes place, as was the case last year.

A year ago the Chancellor's GDR visit was heralded long in advance, leading to no end of speculation. "People here found that hard to stomach," he explains.

East Berlin was currently again upset about details of the Chancellor's letter to Herr Honecker having been leaked in Bonn. So it seems reasonable to assume that after Mr Brezhnev's visit to Bonn, which is scheduled for November, Herr Schmidt's visit will this time be announced and undertaken without much in the way of prior announcements, possibly coming as a surprise. Early winter is a likely deadline.


Klaus Bölling ... informal chats
(Photo: Sven Simon)

An excursion to Werbellin-See in the Brandenburg countryside near Potsdam is an occasion for surmise about what might have been.

In August 1980 Helmut Schmidt was to have arrived at Werbellin-See station for his visit to the GDR. The station building and approach roads were spruced up in readiness. But the visit was cancelled.

It is an old-world station, a black-and-white building in the middle of the forest, looks as pretty as a picture.

At the station, on the boat across the lake and during the stroll to Schloss Hubertusstock, where the Chancellor was to have stayed, his man in East Berlin is recognised.

People come up to him to ask questions. "When is Helmut Schmidt finally due to come then?" "We really can't afford to fall apart in petty argument."

His interlocutors are anything but dissidents. They are perfectly normal people, Party members even, who are well aware that events have taken different courses in the two German states.

Yet they still expect small steps towards normal neighbourly relations, and this is an experience Klaus Bölling feels distinctly pleasurable.

"People recognise you but they don't stare at you as though you were something out of this world. They come up to you and engage in factual discussion.

"What is more, people turn out to be well informed and to have distinct and subtle differences of opinion of their own."

He is very much a man for everyday encounters with the man in the street in the GDR, where he has travelled widely in the past few months: "I have now familiarised myself with almost the entire GDR."

He is also keen to meet the people in East Berlin. Near his official residence in Niederschönhausen there is a bar where local people can see him in private life, as it were.

Here he is not formally dressed. You will find him at the bar in an open-necked shirt or a polo-necked sweater chatting about soccer, the family and, of course, politics.

Yet there is always a thought at the back of his mind in the bar, on the street, when visiting neighbours or sending out invitations to artists and writers.

"I always wonder whether I might not be doing them more harm than good. Maybe they feel I want to provoke them, or maybe they feel I want to ingratiate myself by echoing their views."

These are difficulties that even occur in encounters between young people from either side of the intra-German border.

Visiting youngsters from the West often encounter dissatisfaction because they claim to know everything better and reckon to have first claim on true socialism.

"That riles people here. They are politically aware youngsters well capable of judgements of their own and with no intention of having their opinions decided by others.

"They are not on the lookout for West German models either. There are certain things they would like to change, but in the context of their own situation."

He even claims to have come across a growing sensitivity on the part of GDR officials towards these young people. In view of developments in Poland a number of trade union officials are also changing their tune, he says.

"Never a day passes but you learn something new here. I have no doubt that I too have had to reappraise a number of preconceived notions."

But there is also the mental oppression, as he calls it, the continual attempts to isolate West Germans in the GDR, be it at the Interhotel in Leipzig or in the bar opposite his official residence.

Time and again, although without demonstrative outrage, he comes back to the Berlin Wall. He is still unable to accept the Wall as something normal.

Often he has to cross it, and even with a diplomatic passport he is sometimes made to wait by petty-minded officials. But cross it he must, "if only to be able to telephone in private from West Berlin."

Bölling's attitude towards the Wall reflects his personal outlook towards the GDR. He was born in Potsdam in 1928 and spent his early years as a cub journalist in the GDR at a time when the two German states were drifting steadily further apart.

Now he is back, but his old home has changed even more. Yet he takes a level-headed view of political reality.

"In *Deutschlandpolitik* you can get nowhere against the wishes of the GDR; you must have its consent."

His relations with GDR leaders are governed by this level-headed realism. He is courteous in tone but definite, not to say tough, in what he has to say.

He is not given to conveying false [...]

Continued on page 6

■ THE ECONOMY

Blueprint for keeping a crisis at bay

Only the impact of massive private investment can prevent a world-wide economic crisis, says Professor Hanns-Joachim Rüstow. Together with John Maynard Keynes and Michael Kalecki, Professor Rüstow, 80, is one of the founders of modern macro-economic theories. In this article, he calls for a different use of the funds now provided by the Bank for Reconstruction to promote investments by small and medium-sized industry.

The alarming rise in unemployment has been no surprise to seasoned economists. They have known all along that drastic interest rate increases must throttle any upswing and lead to more jobless.

Employment, and hence growth, are inextricably linked with the overall rate of investment.

By the same token, investments in a market economy dominated by private enterprise are governed by the cost of money and anticipated profits.

The retarding effect of rising interest rates on investment activities is particularly pronounced because higher investment costs go hand-in-hand with lower anticipated profits.

Following the upswing that began in mid-1975, the number of employed (which had been dropping) rose by more than 900,000 due to rising investments.

But the central bank's interest rate policy, starting from 1979, led to the disastrous consequences which began to show in the spring of 1980.

As it turned out, it subsequently became impossible to reduce the discount rates because the drastic price increases for imported oil had led to a large balance of payments deficit.

This was largely due to the fact that the Opec countries did not use their mammoth earnings for imports from the oil-consuming nations.

Hundreds of billions of dollars that flowed into Opec coffers were not recycled but found their way to the Eurodollar markets. There, we can borrow that money to pay for our oil bill provided our interest rates (in real terms) do not lag behind those of other oil-importing countries — primarily America.

Among proposals to counter unemployment was one that investment costs be reduced through subsidies.

The idea was to subsidise those investments that would reduce our need for imported oil, promote environment protection and further the construction of private housing.

Housing has been particularly hard hit by high interest rates.

On *8 April 1981*, the government announced its programme for low-interest credits to be paid for through the Reconstruction Loan Corporation from DM6.3bn that was to be raised on international money markets.

But the DM6.3bn in low-interest investment credits is a drop in the ocean considering our total annual investments of DM350bn. This applies even if the DM6.3bn were to be used only for those investments that would otherwise not have been made. The fact, however, is that some of these investments would have been made at any cost and require no subsidising.

The effect would be quite different if this money were to be used to reduce the interest burden on investments financed by commercial banks.

If, for instance, the cost of investment money in the three instances mentioned — lowering overseas oil dependence, environment protection and housing — were to be reduced through subsidies by 3 percentage points over a period of 3 years, DM9bn would suffice to make investments worth *DM10bn considerably* cheaper.

Even by using the still available portions of the DM6.3bn in this way in the first year of the subsidy period investments could be stimulated considerably. (This is so even assuming that far from all subsidised investments would go into additional projects that would otherwise not be realised, and that not all of these subsidised projects serve the objectives the government wants to promote.)

Relatively few additional billions used to reduce interest rates in the second subsidy year could result in considerably stepped up investments.

And it is not only new jobs that depend on the investment volume. This must also be a decisive factor in determining whether old plants that can no longer meet their costs through their output are shut down and the staff laid off. Even workers producing capital goods spend the available money (which has not gone into savings accounts or been paid to the state) on consumer goods. As a result, profits for goods sold to workers must be the larger the larger the proportion of capital goods and the smaller that of consumer goods in the GNP.

As the investment volume diminishes, the ratio between average wage costs and the production earnings of the employer shrinks (regardless of nominal wages) and the more jobs become redundant for reasons of profitability. The shutting down of plants is greatly dependent on the development of the investment ratio in any given economic phase.

As a result, the higher the investment ratio the higher the profits for business — and these have shrunk to the danger point.

Stepped-up investments thus not only improve the balance sheet of newly created jobs on the one hand and the redundancies due to shutting down on the other; they also improve the prospect of profits.

As a result, the effect on employment of cheaper investment credits is only marginally reduced by the fact that some of the additional investments are only being made than originally planned.

Using the unspent portion of the DM6.3bn to subsidise interest rates could thus prevent a further rise in unemployment.

Only a few billion over and above this amount used for this purpose could in fact trigger a new upswing and rising employment.

Tax revenues would rise, social security spending go down and the budget consolidation would be swifter.

Further cutbacks in government spending would have a depressing effect on business and would only promote further unemployment.

Recent favourable forecasts for 1982 are based on a misunderstanding of cyclical theories and the context between the development of investments, the degree of employment and growth. Neither the Keynesians nor the monetarists see this context correctly.

What matters, therefore, is to arrive at new investment-promoting decisions by the autumn in the hope that these will not come too late to prevent a disastrous economic development. Such decisions could mark the turning point.

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 19 August 1981)

Concern over trend of unemployment

Two million jobless by 1985, as [illegible] predict, is neither a certainty [illegible] it an arbitrary horror figure pulled out [illegible] the hat.

While the tug-of-war between the [illegible] ties over principles and the size of [illegible] budget continues, experts are [illegible] the prospects of full employment [illegible] more. Their unanimous view is that [illegible] is not in sight and that there is [illegible] provement in the offing either.

The economic and labour policy [illegible] in the years to come can be [illegible] with the help of a few figures.

Unemployment this year and in [illegible] is likely to be between 1.3 and 1.4 [illegible] lion.

Another 1.2 million job seekers [illegible] crowd the labour market by 1985. [illegible] a real economic growth of 2.5 per [illegible] and an equal increase in the productivity [illegible] rate, the situation on the labour market [illegible] could improve.

Theoretically, one strategy in [illegible] jobs could be to administratively [illegible] or negotiate reduced productivity in [illegible] lective bargaining.

But common sense tells us that this [illegible] impossible.

It can hardly be meaningful to [illegible] legions of potentially jobless to [illegible] with hammer and pliers while at the [illegible] same time world trade and the [illegible] of other industrial nations develop [illegible] to efficient technology.

The task facing politicians and [illegible] partners in collective bargaining is [illegible] different nature. After the war, German [illegible] business benefited from an inflow [illegible] capital and technical know-how, especially from the United States.

Germany's strength at the time by [illegible] its acceptance and support of this process.

This resulted in high growth [illegible] capital accumulation, GNP and consumption.

Later, politicians and the parties [illegible] collective bargaining failed to realise the [illegible] the level of consumption and the [illegible] available for distribution could not [illegible] secured in the long run through the [illegible] post-war investment process. The importance of follow-up investments was [illegible] imised.

What matters now is to reverse the [illegible] process. Those who refuse to accept the [illegible] labour market forecast until 1985 [illegible] also oppose the existing projections [illegible] real growth and investment.

If the growth figures are inadequate [illegible] produce an acceptable number of [illegible] and internationally competitive jobs the [illegible] must be hiked via incentives [illegible] from tax relief to the development [illegible] wages in real terms. Regardless whether we pursue a supply-side or a demand-side policy, what matters is to stimulate investments.

This is the crux in the current [illegible] debate. Those who demand that the [illegible] portance of employment not be over[illegible] looked in the concern with the consolidation of the budget should not hamper investments through a surtax on income tax.


There can be little point in curbing investments through such a tax only [illegible] use the added revenue to finance a couple of programmes for noise abatement and the like. This would do more harm than good where employment is concerned.

Hans D. [illegible]

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 August [illegible])

ENERGY

West over a barrel, but Opec grip slips



[illegible] the end, market forces are always [illegible] stronger than any cartel. Even the [illegible]'s most powerful cartel, Opec, had [illegible] to this fact when 13 members [illegible] unable to arrive at a prices policy [illegible] the end of fruitless and acrimonious negotiations at its Geneva conference, [illegible] chairman Dr Subroto had no [illegible] but to admit: "We're no further [illegible] the day we started our talks."


[illegible] could just as well have said that [illegible] conference had not progressed [illegible] the point it reached at the [illegible] meeting last May in Geneva.

[illegible], too, the Opec countries failed [illegible] such agreement. Neither had they at [illegible] previous meeting in Bali.

[illegible] the beginning of this year, Opec [illegible] been chasing its tail and showing [illegible] sign of disintegration. Prices for [illegible] crude are still irresponsibly high [illegible] the 13 member nations last year ac[illegible] counted for 57 per cent of the petro[illegible] produced outside the East Bloc.

[illegible] only five years ago, when the car[illegible] was at its peak, more than 65 per [illegible] of the oil produced in the free [illegible] world came from Opec countries. Since [illegible] the share of Opec oil has been [illegible] sinking steadily. Thus market forces [illegible] more prevailed in a world that was [illegible] under the tenfold increase of [illegible] petroleum prices since 1973.

The price excesses of the cartel led to [illegible] development of the new oil wells [illegible] its sphere of influence, to eco[illegible] measures and to the use of such substitutes as coal and natural gas.



[illegible] world-wide recession, which is [illegible] due to excessive petroleum prices, [illegible] led to diminished demand.

[illegible] tanks of the oil-consuming coun[illegible] are fuller than ever before and new [illegible] wells are being opened up daily.

[illegible] Opec's lack of restraint in its price [illegible] policy has thus clearly backfired. Never [illegible] since 1973 has its petroleum production [illegible] lower and never before has the car[illegible] found it so hard to find buyers at the [illegible] prices fixed by the 13.

For the first time in modern oil his[illegible] tory, the Opec country Iran is now advertising in London newspapers in a de[illegible] scale bid to find buyers.

In the first half of this year, 12 Opec countries reduced their output by about [illegible] per cent and some of them, like Ku[illegible] by even more.

[illegible] Subroto has little choice but to admit in Geneva that his cartel produces 1.5 to 2 million barrels a day more than it can sell.

A contributing factor here has been Saudi Arabia, the only staunch ally of the West in the cartels.

Saudi Arabia's oil minister, the sagacious Western trained Sheikh Yamani, has put up a stout resistance to the constant price hikes — primarily by such radical countries as Libya, Algeria and Nigeria.

But even Yamani, who offset the shortfall in the oil production due to the Iranian-Iraqi war by stepping up his own country's output, is not as unselfish as he seems to be.

As the cartel's biggest producer, accounting for about half of Opec's total output, he has been making use of his strong position on behalf of the Saudi royal family, and he seems to regard the West as a suitable ally for his policy.

In Geneva, he was prepared to increase his self-imposed price limit of $34 a bbl by one dollar to persuade the other 12 Opec members to agree on a uniform price.

But Iran's inexperienced new oil minister, Mohammed Gharazi (whose every other sentence stressed the necessity of fighting imperialism), spared the West a new price increase.

Gharazi refused to depart from the present $36 price and was adamant in rejecting the freezing of oil prices until the end of 1982 as called for by Yamani. Thus Yamani also withdrew his compromise offer of $35 and reverted to the existing $32 per bbl.

The cracks within Opec which had first become visible at the Caracas conference in late 1979 but were papered over at the time are now clearly in evidence.

What little papering remained in Geneva was publicly torn down in the corridors of the Intercontinental Hotel when a Nigerian delegate said that his country would now undersell even Saudi Arabia.

Until now, Nigeria's official price has been $40, but it has also offered its oil on the free market for slightly over $35.

Considering the fact that the quality of Nigerian oil is better than that of Saudi Arabian, Nigeria only has to reduce its price by half a dollar to undercut Yamani.

Nigeria's attitude becomes understandable in the light of the fact that, according to official figures, its former output of 2 million bbls a day has dropped to 700,000.

Rumour in Geneva had it that the true output now is only 450,000 bbls — less than one-quarter the former production. As a result, Nigeria is barely in a position to pay for goods already on order from the West, which it sorely needs for its industrialisation.

After two days of preliminary talks and an actual conference of three days, which eventually shifted from the conference room to the private suites of the oil ministers, Subroto announced a unique resolution.

In view of the inability of the oil ministers to come to an agreement, the heads of state and government were called upon to establish contact by telephone and find some sort of a compromise.

By shifting the decision from Opec to the heads of government the cartel actually sounded its own death knell.

Where the oil came from

oil supplied to Fed Rep Germany in 1980

Imports of crude oil in 1980 totalled 97.9 million tonnes

Iraq	2.8
Soviet Union	2.9
Norway	3.1
Iran	5.8
Algeria	6.3
UAE	6.4
Nigeria	11.0
Britain	14.6
Libya	14.9
Saudi Arabia	24.6
Others	5.5

Granted, Opec will continue to exist; but after the Geneva conference it will no longer be the Opec that has been tightening the screws on the thumbs of industrial and — even more so — developing countries, giving an extra turn from time to time for good measure.

Libya's oil minister Zagaar was the first to recognise the danger that lay in shifting the decision to the heads of government. He refused to contact Gaddafi, saying: "Gaddafi's job is to defend the freedom of Lybia and not to haggle over dollars."

He went on to say that unless the unity of Opec were restored he did not exclude the possibility of a "People's Opec". This would consist of the Socialist Opec nations, would not only promote its own market interests but would not only fight competition from the traditional Opec.

As things now stand, the free world can regain its freedom of action and rid itself of the blackmail by the hitherto powerful cartel — a chance nobody would have dared hope for only a few years ago.

Wolfgang Müller-Haeseler

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 24 August 1981)

More than just politics behind American gas supply hint

At the Ottawa summit, president Reagan made vague and non-committal suggestion that Europe buy its energy from the United States rather than importing natural gas from the Soviet Union.

America has growing quantities of natural gas for export and a number of companies would like to make such a deal.

Europe in fact, might be using American gas by the end of the decade.

Reagan's suggestion was heavily politically motivated. He the Soviet deal will make Western Europe excessively dependent on the East Bloc, even if the amount of fuel is less than originally thought.

Despite the fact that Bonn would like to see the contract with Moscow signed, sealed and delivered and that considerable business interests of such industrial mammoths as Mannesmann (pipes) and AEG (compressors) hinge on the deal, we should keep an open mind towards the Reagan proposal. American gas could prove a fine supplement to our current supplies.

Unlike a few years ago, when stringent American price controls curbed gas exploration, resulting in shortages, America now has ample supplies because drilling has been stepped up.

Changing prices were permitted to float under the Carter Administration — at least so far as gas in the individual states was concerned.

Only the gas that is traded among the states is still subject to price controls. But they, too, will be lifted in 1983.

This part-liberalisation has led to a boom in the US gas business and is likely to impart even further impulses once the remaining restrictions are lifted. In other words, America's already ample gas supplies will be boosted still further and are likely to reach a volume that will make exports attractive.

Many gasfields that are ready to produce have been sealed again because of a lack of buyers. This applies particularly to the huge Appalachian fields.

Experts stress that much of the necessary infrastructure needed for gas exports is already available. A complete gas terminal was built some years ago in Cove Point, in Maryland, to enable tankers carrying liquid gas from Algeria to unload.

But the deal fell through due to excessive Algerian demands.

The facility has been mothballed but is completely operational and could serve exports to Europe provided a liquefaction plant is installed. This type of export becomes feasbile at a volume at 10bn cubic metres a year or more.

The Essen-based Ruhrgas AG, Europe's biggest gas importer, has so far been lukewarm about gas imports from America. But this could change in the next few years — especially in view of the fact that the company is not exactly enchanted about the envisaged deal with the Soviet Union.

This is borne out by remarks of Ruhrgas board members to the effect that the Russian gas is not vital to Germany.

The following rule of thumb applies to gas purchases: transportation by pipeline is cheaper at distances of up to 3,000 km. Beyond that, it is cheaper to use liquid gas tankers.

Bearing in mind that the pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe would extend over some 5,000 km, it becomes obvious that Soviet gas would probably be more expensive than American gas carried by tankers.

The German gas industry stresses that a deal with the Soviet Union would in no way preclude gas purchases from the United States. A number of contracts are due to expire in the 1990s and alternatives will have to be sought. This could well prove a chance for US gas.

Helmut Maier-Mannhart

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 August 1981)

Continued from page 5

Bölling

impressions of harmony but not interested in provocation either. "Plain speaking is what you need here, but that does not mean confrontation."

He gets on well with Herr Honecker himself. There was a time, a little over 30 years ago, when they worked almost side by side.

This has given anti-Communists in Bonn a welcome opportunity of objecting to Klaus Bölling as permanent representative in East Berlin.

And stones have been thrown since he took office too. Klaus Bölling bows to the Red dictatorship, the CSU's Graf Huyn went on record as saying after he was given military honours at his first official reception.

But by and large Bölling has gained political detachment from the noises of battle back in Bonn. He has grown more relaxed.

As head of Bonn's mission in the GDR he has to abide by instructions but cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said to have a normal civil service routine.

Above all, he is not obliged to skip from one subject to another as he was in Bonn. Here he is in a position to concentrate on every little detail of a single subject.

He can "devote thought to how progress can be accomplished in *Deutschlandpolitik* and to the development of perspectives for the future."

At times he feels a little impatient. "The process of normalisation will take a long time yet." Yet he is gratified to be able to help individuals here and now — without making a song and dance about it.

So Herr Bölling is somewhat sceptical about the meeting between Schmidt and Honecker. He says not to expect too much to come of it.

In common with the Chancellor he would like to be able to prevent international political tension from rebounding on intra-German ties.

But the atmosphere is chillier and leeway has been reduced. "There will not be productive progress again until the great powers are on better terms."

Major issues are not what is called for at present. The prospects look better for a solution to issues that appear small fry when looked at from Bonn but are important for people in Berlin, such as improved visiting regulations.

Contrary to the views held by others Klaus Bölling reserves the right, despite empty coffers in Bonn, to continue to use financial means of improving conditions for Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

"But naturally a balance must be struck between what is given and what counter-concessions are offered in return."

Peter Kutschke

(Vorwärts, 27 August 1981)

THE SEA

New international maritime court to be based in Hamburg

...burg is to be the seat of the ...national Court for Maritime Affairs, ...UN Law of the Sea Conference has ...in Geneva. It will be the first UN ...ever based in the Federal Republic ...Germany. Split, in Yugoslavia, and ...the Portuguese capital, also app... There will be 21 judges, all from ...ent countries. When the court is set ...ll depend on when the new Inter...al Law of the Sea Convention ...into force. After seven years at the ...rence table the draft is nearing ...ation. The Enterprise, or interna... seabed mining authority, is to be ... near Kingston, Jamaica.

...nn was in a tight corner at the UN ...aw of the Sea Conference, the ...session of which has just ended in ...a.

...mburg's successful bid for the new ...national Court for Maritime Affairs ...more than a mark of the political ...m in which the Federal Republic of ...many is held.

...was also more than the result of ...ssful promotion, although the con...nce chairman said women members ...e Bonn delegation had worked par...larly hard and effectively behind the ...es.

A number of delegations that backed ...mburg rather than Split or Lisbon ...l certainly have done so with clear ...pectations of a successful applicant.

They will have expected the future ...stodian of the new Law of the Sea, as ...ere, to work particularly hard to ...e that the new Convention is ...oved.

...t Bonn has voiced reservations and ...ed amendments it would like to ...made to major features of the con...ion draft that has been on the table ...the past year.

...ey have much in common with the ...n held by the United States and ...e mainly to access to seabed mining ...the decision-making processes by ...h it is to be governed.

...th the Germans and the Americans ...d like to see a more liberal regime ...greater heed to the interests and ...rtance of the technologically ...nced industrialised countries.

...various groups outside the confer...e proper, soundings are being taken ...where there is still leeway for ...ndments and improvements without ...g into question the results of eight ...of negotiations.

...e German and US delagations are ...alone in expressing a desire for ...ndments and additions.

...less they are considered, the others ...argue, the convention cannot poss... be regarded as either balanced or as ...sis on which consensus might be ...hed.

...tablished producers of cobalt, man...se, nickel and copper have called ...better safeguards against the com...tion seabed output could prove to be.

...ates without coastlines or with ...ted access to the sea have called for ...eater share in the exploitation of ...stocks and seabed resources in the ...usive economic zones allocated to ...tal countries.

...thers would like to see a resumption ...discussion about the right of passage ...ugh territorial waters and straits.

...here are also issues still unresolved ...any yardstick, such as the admissibility of bodies such as the European Community and liberation organisations as parties to and beneficiaries of the convention.

Or take the delimitation of overlapping territorial waters and economic zones by neighbouring countries at daggers drawn over this and other disputes.

What, for the matter, about transitional arrangements to prepare for the institutions envisaged by the terms of the convention and to draw up rules by which they are to be governed?

Hard-liners have urged the conference to conclude discussion of these issues in a fortnight and declare the existing negotiating text ready for approval with as few amendments as possible.

A majority of the Group of 77, which represents the Third World, is also in favour of formalising the draft convention, which is currently no more than an informal text.

But the Third World countries would prefer not to close the door as long as the United States is still reviewing its policy on the Law of the Sea.

So the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference will reconvene for its eleventh session next spring in New York.

But delegations at Geneva noted with reference to the clash between Libya and the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean what chaotic and potentially critical developments might arise if agreement were not reached soon on an acceptable compromise.

This incident, it was further argued, surely showed that seabed mining was by no means the crucial, let alone the only problem by which a convention stood or fell.


At least as much consideration must be given to strategic, transport, fishing and research interests.

So no-one could be keen to overstep the mark or conclude a convention agreed without the consent or approval of the United States.

Were this to come about, Bonn would be in a tight corner whichever line it took. Its special security and seabed mining interests would be in deep water regardless whether it ratified the convention or chose to side with America and not do so. That is why a number of countries expect Bonn to play a more active part as a mediator.

Wolfram van den Wyenbergh

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 24 August 1981)



Ostertor ... an oil guzzler

(Photo: dpa)

Ship outfitted specially to mop up oil slicks

The North Sea oil rig supply ship *Ostertor* is being refitting at Elsfleth, near Bremen, to mop up oil slicks in German waters.

The Bonn and coastal *Land* governments bought the ship for DM7.8m and are spending DM3m on the refit.

The *Ostertor* will be able to mop up a capacity 600 tons of oil using two suction pumps with an hourly intake of 80 tons.

After refitting the ship will also have 2,000 metres of inflatable breakwater rolled on drums in special containers and the pumps to inflate it.

The ship will be ready for service again by the end of October but not fully refitted until March next year, which is when another device is to be put through its paces.

It is a DM30m-plus vessel with twin keels 85 metres long dubbed the *Ölsau*, or oil sow. In waves up to three metres the ship is designed to mop up roughly 5,000 tons of oil slick.

This experimental vessel has been commissioned by a Cuxhaven oil catastrophe committee from the Lühring shipyard in Brake on the lower reaches of the Weser.

Using adjustable propellers the twin sections of the keel can be opened up into a V-shape. Rotating rollers then scoop up the oil slick.

Between now and 1984 several oil slick vessels are to be built or converted at a combined cost of roughly DM100m.

The fleet will consist of eight flat-bottomed ships capable of negotiating the North Sea coastal shallows and eight seagoing vessels stationed in various ports.

A particularly important development for dealing with oil slicks is an experimental computerised forecasting system to forecast the speed, direction and hour-by-hour position of oil slicks.

Mop-up vessels can then be rushed to the spot. Let us assume that one cell of an oil tanker is ripped open in a collision in the busy German Bight.

The original position of the slick is fed to a computer programmed by Hamburg University department of oceanology and the German Hydrographic Institute, also in Hamburg.

Speed and direction of the slick can be forecast with reference to the various currents in the sector, to tides and water density and to the powerful wind drift in the North Sea.

Weather data are supplied by the German Meteorological Service in Offenbach, near Frankfurt am Main.

The computer then prints out a forecast of the slick's speed of travel, which in medium wind and swell will be about one-and-a-half knots.

This project was launched in September 1979 but practical trials have only been in progress since May 1981 and are due to end in mid-September.

Non-stop operation of such a crucial experiment has been stymied because the Federal Environment Office in West Berlin lacks the few hundred thousand marks in funds it would take to keep the project going.

Captain Manfred Jahn of Cuxhaven, whose job it is to coordinate oil disaster relief work, is most upset that the project looks like folding for lack of cash.

Early warning of the oil slick's progress could give rescue workers a head's start in protecting ecologically important areas such as the North Sea coastal shallows and, of course, the beaches.

In 13 major shipwrecks over the past six years a mere 3,000 tons of oil have spilt into the German sector of the North Sea.

But for years statisticians have been warning that by the law of probability this area is due for a major tanker disaster before long. *dpa*

(Der Tagesspiegel, 23 August 1981)

From Kiel to Moscow on the Great Pipeline Run

Russia plans to ship from Kiel to Moscow the 10 million tonnes of steel pipeline Germany is to supply in return for natural gas.

Mayor Karl-Heinz Luckhardt of Kiel made this announcement after five hours of talks with Vladimir Tikhinov, Soviet Deputy Shipping Minister.

Starting next April regular line shipping services are to link the Baltic port and the Soviet capital. There will be two runs a month with a capacity of between 5,000 and 6,000 tonnes of steel.

Services to and from Kiel will be handled by the Soviet merchant navy.

Mr Tikhinov also dealt with the possibility of a rail ferry link between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union.

He travelled from Kiel to Lübeck to discuss this possibility further.

Herr Luckhardt says the Soviet Union is considering rail ferry services between a West German port and either Klaipeda (Memel) or Tallinn (Reval).

Kiel and Lübeck are not alone in being considered as destinations. So are Hamburg and Bremen. The Russians are thinking in terms of two Soviet and two German ferries.

The authorities were still considering the relative advantages of the various locations and a final decision had yet to be taken, but Herr Luckhardt said that after his talks with Mr Tikhinov he felt sure a decision would be reached soon.

Mr Tikhinov said trade between the two countries had reached such a level that regular freighter services seemed appropriate.

As for the rail ferry link, he hoped the Bonn Transport Ministry would give its approval before long.

He saw no problems arising from the differences in gauge between Western European and Soviet railways.

There had been rail ferry services between Lübeck and Finland for over five years and Finland too had broad-gauge railways.

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 24 August 1981)

■ THE CINEMA

Fassbinder's 'Lola': all action at the Villa Fink

Film director Rainer Werner Fassbinder evidently has something along the lines of a screen compendium of German history in mind.

Lola equally obviously is, in this compendium, his treatment of the post-war *Wirtschaftswunder*, or 'economic miracle' of reconstruction and restoration.

He deals with West Germany in the prosperious 50s as a follow-on, so to speak, to his *Lili Marleen* and *The Marriage of Maria Braun*.

We are shown the post-war period against a background of typical interior decor, of *Nierentische*, or 'kidney-shaped' coffee tables, 'cocktail' armchairs, mobiles and *Mecki* hedgehog mascots.

The Adenauer era is at its height. 'No Experiments' is the political slogan. The scene is a small town in Germany in a fever of reconstruction and affluence.

The man whose opinion counts in town is Schuckert, a wealthy building contractor played by Mario Adorf. The local bigwigs all pay him their respects, even when they meet in the evening at Villa Fink, the local brothel.

Lola, played by Barbara Sukowa, is the star of the show at Villa Fink; she is also Herr Schuckert's private and personal harlot.

The peace and quiet of the local bigwigs are upset when a new borough engineer and surveyor arrives on the scene. He is Herr von Bohm, played by Armin Mueller-Stahl, who falls promptly in love with Lola.

He is more or less enslaved to her and prepared to run amok in the peaceful, corrupt little city and take the lid off its scandals.

The town is in uproar until Schuckert comes up with the idea of making von Bohm a present of Lola, and suddenly everything is bright and beautiful again in this small town in 1957 Germany.

It is a Fassbinder happy end. Schuckert gives Lola Villa Fink as a wedding present and she hops into bed with him in return while still wearing her wedding veil.

Lola is a Fassbinder period piece combining many of his favourite topics, such as the contradiction between morality and politics, between love and faithfulness, between success and corruption, between decency and the main chance.

He is often extremely effective in his reckoning with the period, including what are arguably shameless effects. In cold elegance and ambiguity he provides us with a shorthand outline of post-war experience.

His imagery incorporates the errors and shortcomings and the deceptive happiness of an affluent decade, regularly interspersed with bombshell effects whenever the action threatens to become inordinately *gemütlich* or nostalgic.

Yet *Lola* can still not be described as a success. Whereas in *The Marriage of Maria Braun* an individual's tale is told, in *Lola* the *Zeitgeist* is only shown at times.

Maria Braun assumes exemplary quality by virtue of its repletion with German *milieu* and contemporary historical background. *Lola*, despite an expensive historical facade, does not.

The tale is too limited to subdued lighting effects, gentlemen's evenings, suppressed belches from champagne, black garters and lingerie.

Fassbinder has here made it too easy for himself. The smooth-cheeked babyfaces of the affluent years, with their survival techniques and prostitution, remain short on profile.

Not for nothing does he go for acoustic effects, one imagines. One hears the old pop songs from the console radiogram and the laissez-faire liberal talk of the Erhard economic era at Villa Fink.

The acoustic symbol is given tongue because the visible world fails in its bid to embody symbolism.

But many of the parts are brilliantly played. Barbara Sukowa, a terrific girl in Fassbinder's TV serialisation of Döblin's 20s novel *Berlin Alexanderplatz*, is here a new Fassbinder superstar in her own right.

She successfully prevails against a director who is known for his dictatorial handling of manpower. She is invariably worth seeing, embodying both total simplicity and the quality of a determined beast.

Yet even when she has to wade deep in the muck she still retains a vestige of reliable human quality.

Alongside her we see the former GDR screen star Armin Mueller-Stahl, who gives us her helpless lover sensitively and memorably as a kind of latterday Professor Unrat, the small-town teacher bewitched and made a fool of by Marlène Dietrich in *The Blue Angel*.

Mario Adorf as the building contractor gives us the post-war profitmaker as a sympathetic swine.


But a number of minor roles, as so often with Fassbinder, are unfortunately depicted in a grotesque manner.

Fassbinder's bid to take the lid off the deceptive iconography of the 50s, to ironise the showy side of the all-round satisfaction behind which apathy and conformity, petty bourgeois morality and corruption lurk does not prove a success.

He deals in terms of decorative arts and crafts with the formal challenge posed by an era. In the final analysis the lion's forepaw that repeatedly seems about to strike lands with no more force than that of a hedgehog's paw.

Uta Gote

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 22 August 1981)



Barbara Sukowa as Lola ... a role of contradictions (Photo: ...)

Chinese film crew develop taste for German beer

At seven in the morning a five-man Chinese camera crew were at the ready on a Munich main square to film Germans on their way to work.

But rush-hour traffic for the most part takes place at several underground levels and the lighting was inadequate.

The Chinese would have preferred to start with a shot of the sunrise over Munich, but their German partners discouraged them, saying that would be a little too conventional.

The crew from Studio Peking are the first from the People's Republic of China ever to film footage in the Federal Republic of Germany.

They are also working on the first-ever German-Chinese co-production. It will be aimed at a mass market of millions of cinemagoers and will, it is hoped, make a substantial contribution towards mutual understanding.

This hope is expressed by Bohemia Film director William Janovsky from Munich. Janovsky is a Czech who graduated from the Prague Film Academy but came to the West in 1968 and has since produced over 40 documentaries in Germany and elsewhere.

The 95-minute co-production is to be entitled *Notes from Germany in 1981*, although it will in fact deal only with West Germany and West Berlin.

There will, however, be footage of the River Elbe where it is the frontier between the two German states. The Chinese learnt that the Elbe was Germany's frontier back in the ninth century although then it separated Germans and Slavs.

Mr Bai, heading the Peking film makers, has little to say about the political content of the film as planned. His interpreter explains that only the positive aspects are to be shown, and production manager Michael Dost felt the Chinese concept was initially somewhat on the superficial side.

After long evenings of discussion he feels the Chinese will come round to his way of thinking that the problems and less satisfactory aspects of life in the Federal Republic cannot be overlooked.

But to begin with the Chinese camera crew in their blue tunics seemed intent on capturing on film the sunny side of Bavaria, which will account for roughly half the total footage.

They filmed Munich folk shopping at the Viktualienmarkt and drinking Bavarian beer. They too developed a taste for beer. They also took a look at a beergarden near the city's Chinese tower.

They have also decided, improvising as they went along, to shoot scenes of a Corpus Christi religious procession and a jousting tournament in the countryside.

Mr Bai is keen to screen scenes of the countryside. Eighty per cent of Chinese live in the countryside, he explains.

Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss, a regular visitor to China, has promised to give an interview. He would prefer to set it against the background of picturesque Rott am Inn, home town of Herr Strauss's wife Marianne.

Annemarie Renger, deputy speaker of the Bonn Bundestag, also plans to give an interview over a cup of tea on the Rhine. Top industrial managers and trade union leaders are also on the ... list.

German industry is to feature prominently in the film. So the crew ... heading for the Ruhr, while ... Rhine region, Trier and ... birthplace and the Porta Nigra ... covered.

A look is to be taken at the ... educational system, which ... feel to be exemplary. About ...

Continued on page 1...



Getting to grips with local customs (Photo: Thomas Stankiewitz)

ARTIFACTS

Bottle party celebrates discovery of a very old incredible hulk

...y 30 people are sitting amid the ...pressive ruins of the Temple of ... Samos, not far from the famous ... Polycrates.

...are chatting, laughing, singing ...sing the bottle round. They are ... members of the German Ar...ical Institute, Athens and their ...sistants.

...are celebrating a "find of the ..." – an almost undamaged statue ...ng man five metres tall, or three ...life-size.

...an archaeologists have been dig... on the island, which is off the ... Asia Minor, since 1910, so no...pected a find of this importance ...d to be unearthed.

...statue was found at what is pre...d to have been the entrance to the ...e of Hera, which was fully de...ed by Western and Eastern barbari... ...00 years ago.

...young man measures five ..., or over 16ft, from top to toe, is ...ost mint condition and is an out...ng piece of worksmanship in ...

...statue is thus two metres taller ... the world-famous Kuros in its ...s museum.

...The find has yet to be scientifically ...ated," says Helmut Kyrieleis ...ens head of the German Archaeolo... *Institute*, "but there can be no doubt whatever that nothing like it has been discovered so far this century."

To see it in perspective one must go back 2,500 years in the island's history to the south where the romantic port of Pythagorion now stands.

Today it has a population of 2,500 at most. In those days more than 100,000 people lived in what, for a while, was the centre of a gigantic state with countless colonies all over the Mediterranean.

In the harbour, the pier of which is still in use, 100 fifty-oar galleys, the island's famed and feared naval fleet, lay at anchor.

The empire was ruled by the notorious tyrant Polycrates, whose name every German senior school student will associate with the Schiller poem *Der Ring des Polykrates*.

It was he who had built the Eupalinos viaduct, a city wall over six kilometres long that can still be seen. It later took Pericles a lengthy siege and battering rams to take the city.

Polycrates also had the best Greek artists at his court. They built him palaces, temples and the Heraion, a magnificent shrine to the goddess Hera three miles outside the ancient city.

Linked to the city by a special avenue five metres wide, it was reputed to be the most beautiful shrine in Ancient Greece.

Magnificent works of art lined the avenue leading up to the temple, which was agreed to be the outstanding architectural achievement of the era.

In addition to a famous statue of Hera that was destroyed in fourth century AD Constantinople, there were statues of the other gods and famous scientists, such as Pythagoras, a man of Samos, and distinguished generals. Rich families were entitled to erect other, sacrificial statues in the temple. The statue of the young man now found seems to have been one of these.

But Samos' glory was soon to decline. Athens and Sparta disputed control over it. It later came under Egyptian, Hellenistic and Roman influence.

In the process it was destroyed so thoroughly that not one stone was left standing on top of the other.

What was left of the magnificent marble works of art was shipped away from the island, used to build new homes or simply burnt into chalk.

Archaeologists have long realised that where a chalk oven now stands there was often a temple in classical antiquity.

Samos was not ceded to modern Greece until 1912, but the Athens section of the German Archaeological Institute had already been associated with excavations on the island for some years.

The total population of Samos was down to 40,000 and it had been forgotten by the rest of the world.

The new find was made by a local man during the two-month summer dig. "We were excavating the entrance to the Temple of Hera because we suspected there might still be works of art in the vicinity," says Helmut Kyrieleis.

"Suddenly our man hit something that looked like a big white stone. It was the statue's shoulder blade."



Three times life size (Photo: Reger)

Once they had laid bare the entire statue the archaeologists discovered that it seemed to have survived the epochs of destruction virtually unscathed.

A leg and an arm were missing, but probably on exhibit in a museum somewhere or other. So they were, having been found years ago, one having been immured into the wall of a house.

The find was made at a time when Greek architects in Samos-Vati, modern capital of the island and 12 miles away, were putting the finishing touches to plans for a DM800,000 extension to the local museum.

The money was to be raised by the Volkswagen Foundation. The architects immediately designed a further extension to house the newly-found five-metre four-ton marble giant.

Karl-Heinz Reger

(Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 August 1981)

Revealing insights into the mysterious Etruscans

Hamburg's Museum of Arts and Crafts, host to the Tutankhamen exhibition, is holding another fascinating insight into the Ancient World, an exhibition on the Etruscans.


There have been many books and articles about the mysterious Etruscans but exhibitions are few and far between. The last major one in Germany was held 25 years ago.

The present exhibition, held in the foyer of an office building and sponsored by the Interversa company, is managed by Wilhelm Hornbostel, head of the Arts and Crafts Museum's department of antiquities.

It is not as comprehensive as the 1956 Cologne exhibition but is still impressive with its 160-odd valuable exhibits illustrating Etruscan art from the early Villanova civilisation of the ninth century BC to the late era.

So it covers nearly a millenium, drawing mainly on the outstanding Etruscan stock of the Arts and Crafts Museum but including work loaned by nearly all major German museums and private collections.

The origin of the Etruscans is far from clear. The latest view is that they were a distinct nation inhabiting the area now known as Tuscany.



Etruscan exhibit (Photo: Catalogue)

Etruria was not a state, merely a league of cities whose inhabitants were evidently well-heeled, relying mainly on agriculture and the ore trade for their prosperity.

In both they had plenty to offer and as a result they were able to invest hea-

Continued on page 12

■ MEDICINE

Effect of those pills influenced by when you take them

The time of day a drug or medicine is taken has a great influence on its effect.

In some cases, the effect is reversed.

Some painkillers are effective twice as long when they are taken early in the morning, for example, or late at night.

The time of the year is also a factor which causes variation.

These differences are, of course important both to the drug industry and to the doctor.

These are only a few of the astonishing findings of chronopharmacology, a *new branch of medicine represented in* Germany by Professor Heinz von Mayersbach of the Hanover Medical School's Anatomy Department.

In an article published in the medical journal *Therapiewoche*, vol. 12/81 he describes the changing effects of drugs.

Most research so far has been devoted to the different effects depending on the time of day, the circadian changes. But recent animal experiments show great differences depending on the season as well.

The changes were evident even with animals that were completely shut off from environmental indicators that act as a natural timing device and tell the animal what the season is.

For example: the duration and colour elements of daylight, the temperature and season-related food.

The time element is most dramatically demonstrated by the fact that a given dosage of a poison can be harmless at one time and lethal at another.

For instance, a phenobarbitone (a sleeping drug) dosage of 190mg per kilo of body weight administered at noon is lethal while the same dosage given at night produces virtually no effects whatsoever.

Every drug has its own effects and reacts differently to changes in the time of day or season.

This can be demonstrated in human beings by using allergies to dust, pollen, certain drugs or even sun rays as an example.

Such allergies are usually caused by the release of the hormone histamine which can result in an itch, asthma, hayfever, etc.

The symptoms are usually treated with antihistamines. But chronopharmacological research shows *that the* antihistamine is less effective when the drug is taken at 7 a.m. But the effects last longer. The effect in the evening is more dramatic but shorter.

The difference is probably because the *body releases less histamine during* the day than later.

Painkillers and local anaesthesia are particularly prone to variation.

The effectiveness is much shorter during the night and in the early hours *of the morning* than *in the* afternoon. Interestingly, such differences occur also with placebos.

The reasons certainly have to do with the biological rhythms of the body in terms of time of day or season.

This coordination of bodily processes with the movement of celestial bodies relates not only to the sleep-wakefulness rhythm but also to tissues and organs.

All tissues and blood samples that have been examined so far in the course of this research project show clear biochemical changes depending on the time of day. The extent of these changes is dramatic, the difference being five- to eightfold.

These rhythmically changing activities of organs and tissues are due to the processes of metabolism. And since the metabolism in its turn depends on the performance of tissues, they must also change in keeping with the time of day in order to fulfil their function.

This rhythmic process is due to the fact that many metabolism processes of cells are incompatible with each other in biochemical terms and can therefore not take place simultaneously but must happen consecutively. In each instance this leads to a rhythmic change in the structure of *the cells*.

Depending on their current condition, certain cells are more sensitive to specific drugs and are thus more or less capable of absorbing them.

Professor von Mayersbach stresses that *this should be taken into account in long*-term treatment since the time of day when a certain medication is taken has a major bearing on its curative effects.

Experiments show that the phases in which a specific drug (as for instance in the case of drugs used in cancer treatment to retard the growth of cells) has the fewest side effects and the most curative effects can be determined and should be taken into account.

The time element is of particular importance in preventing damage to an embryo. Certain anti-cancer drugs develop harmful side effects only at specific times of day.

Rolf Degan

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 22 August 1981)

The Etruscan

Continued from page 11

vily in the arts, as in everyday l… which luxuriously appointed gra… testify.

Their own artistic activities beg… the Villanova civilisation, named … place where finds were made … logna.

In the seventh century BC the … an oriental wave, followed from … 475 BC by a golden age strongly … enced by Ancient Greece.

The Hamburg exhibition clearly … trates these trends. Exhibits illus… categories of monument bequea… us by the Etruscans except w… ings.

The glass cabinets feature a … collection of earthenware pots, … terracotta and exquisite gold w… statues in porous tufa.

Bowls vases, jars and equipm… ternate with figures and jewell… mond-eyed sphinxes one … smile mysteriously.

They set the Etruscans apa… their Greek counterparts both … and in terms of art history.

Unlike the Greeks, Etruscan… neglected life-size statues, probabl… cause they lacked the material. T… not have the marble.

The Hamburg exhibition has … ber of *highlights, especially a gol*… wreath ornament for a corpse … back to the third century BC … acquired by the Arts and Craft… seum.

It was bought for the museum … *six-figure sum in deutschemarks* … tervorsa, the sponsors of the E… exhibition.

Rudolf …

(Kieler Nachrichten, 19 Au…

Film crew

Continued from page 10

are currently studying and conducting research in the Federal Republic.

Heidelberg and Konstanz Universities are twinned with Chinese universities. Two Chinese professors are probing the Bavarian educational system.

After two months' investigation they feel vocational training in Bavarian schools is particularly well worth emulating, whereas they take a dim view of specialisation at senior level.

The German film team lend a hand with information, advice and technical equipment. They too take footage, including footage of how their Chinese counterparts go about their work.

So in fact two films about how Chinese view West Germany are in the making. The one will be screened in 3,000 copies in cinemas and on TV from October in China; the other will be seen in the same order from November in Germany.

It will definitely be a great leap forward in the consciousness of a great but far-off nation.

Karl Stankiewitz

(Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 August 1981)

Helping hand for the not-so-ill

Few people with mental illness are deranged: anxieties, depression, hallucinations, addictions to drugs or alcohol are frequently the problems of otherwise normal people.

Often this sort of illness is automatically *lumped together with more serious* cases.

The psychiatric department of the Ulm University Clinic in Ravensburg has attempted to help by running a survey on rehabilitation in which it compared the views of *mentally normal* people with patients.

A number of surprising findings transpired in the process. Thus, for instance, the number of the healthy who consider that clergymen, social workers, neighbours, employers, spouses and parents should provide a helping hand after discharge from hospital is twice as large as among patients.

Only where follow-up care by hospitals and neurologists is concerned do both groups hold roughly the same view.

There is a great shortage of properly trained clergymen and social workers, so that help from that quarter is inadequate.

And the help that neighbours and employers *can provide is frequently of a* very ambiguous nature.

The people to be rehabilitated are likely to make a point of demonstrating their healthiness and are therefore unlikely to ask for help from employers, *family and acquaintances*.

Unfortunately, psychological disorders are frequently looked on as mental derangement instead of being treated like other illnesses.

Unmarried patients (the survey included *almost only* male patients) put their trust primarily in social workers and to some extent also in employers and ministers.

The younger among the singles depend more on the employer than is generally assumed – and probably *more* than most employers would like.

The young ones in this category also tend to depend on modern open-minded ministers.

The married pin their hopes primarily on the family. Widowed patients show a deep-rooted pessimism, trusting no-one except what remains of the family. It is this group that has the highest suicide rate due to loneliness.

The divorced show a tendency to cling desperately to psychiatrists, social workers, family doctors and employers.

The latter play a particularly important role for divorced women. Many of them focus their entire attention on the job after the breakdown of the marriage.

But once they become psychologically ill even this anchor is in jeopardy. An understanding superior at work can therefore do a great deal to stabilise the condition of such people.

Patients who are hospitalised for the first time pin most of their hopes on their close relatives.

Those who have been hospitalised before no longer like to depend on the family. They hope for help from the pastor, the family doctor, the employer (this is particularly predominant among women) and the psychiatrist (particularly pronounced with men).

This group, which is in and o… hospital and is therefore referred … "revolving door patients", is partic… endangered. They are the loneliest … lonely and are plagued by helples… resignation and pessimism. Their … tives frequently *distance* them… from them.

The reasons are simple: The … applies the yardstick of the healthy … psychological, physical and – … — social consequences to the … are *disastrous not only* because his … ity to perform normal tasks is … but also because he actually chang… differs from other people.


This must eventually lead to … among the healthy. They feel … and ill at ease *with the* … would like nothing better than … of him again.

This is so even when the … shows no signs of his illness. The … fears a relapse and this in itself … ough to make it insecure. The … thus programmed in a vicious …

The patient encapsulates him… withdraws and makes the … he is expected to make. … becomes unfriendly and … who want to help … cements his isolation … being called ungrateful …


Thus those who … sympathy and who … know one thing: … enough. The initiative … contact requires endless … bound to lead to strain … The helping hand must … friendly and yet stubborn … help. A rewarding but tough …

(Der Tagesspiegel, 16 A…



■ SOCIETY

The last pinch for boys' lusty night of bidding



The annual auction of unmarried women in the Rhineland town of Koslar, near Jülich, is in danger of coming to an end.

The stumbling block for the function, which has been run by the traditional number of 80 bachelors in the May Club since 1857, is the data protection laws.

Every April 30 the club meets. The names of the women, all between 16 and 50, are called out, and the bidding takes place.

The women are not present. They wait at home for a messenger to bring the good (or not so good) news.

Successful bidders have the right to wine and dine their purchase throughout May and marry her later.

The marriage does, however, depend on the consent of both parties.

It now appears that this quaint habit including even a bulk-buy arrangement when there were too many women may be destined to founder on the law.

The club no longer has access to the necessary data with which to find suitable females to go under the hammer.

Since North Rhine-Westphalia's Data Abuse Act came into force in December 1978 the Jülich city administration has steadfastly refused to provide the club with the lists of unmarried women.

According to a city spokesman, the Act precludes the disclosure of personal data to unauthorised persons.

But the club argues that it is not "unauthorised".

Walter Kremer, the vice-president of the club and himself a civil servant, put the matter before the Petition Committee of North Rhine-Westphalia's state legislature, asking that an exception be made.

He wrote: "In the past two years we managed to make do with old lists we had, adding names of women who were known to us personally. But this has been unsatisfactory because we cannot possibly learn of all changes in the female population.

"This has led to problems with the annual auctions because the lists in our possession did not show the current position.

"As a result, there has been considerable dissatisfaction because many girls felt that they were deliberately excluded from the auctions.

"I am asking you: how are we to get the names we need when all authorities such as the city administration, schools and churches refuse to cooperate? It is essential for the continued existence of our club that we have access to the citizens' register."

Customarily, the auctioning off takes place in the bar *Zur goldenen Brezel* on the night of 30 April.

Some 100 to 120 women usually come under the hammer. They know about the auction and approve of it but are not present.

The minimum bid which in 1857 (when the club was founded) was 2 groschen has risen to DM5.

The names of the individual women are called out and auctioned off one by one.

The women themselves sit at home awaiting the messenger who tells them what price they have fetched and who the buyer is.

The bachelor has the right to wine and dine his "purchase" throughout the month of May and may marry her later if the two agree.

There have never been any problems, not even as a result of the fact that sometimes there are 80 bachelors for 120 women.

This discrepancy has been solved by auctioning off those women who have not managed to find a buyer themselves as individuals in job lots of, say, five or more.

This practical and — at least for the men — satisfactory solution met with little understanding among the Düsseldorf legislators.

The petition committee passed the buck to the interior ministry which, after a cursory glance at the file, handed the matter back to the committee saying that personal data may be passed on only if the recipient has a justified interest in them and if the interests of the person concerned are in no way harmed.

But since the interior ministry did not want to provoke a rebellion among the bachelors of Koslar it did not dwell on the matter of how justified the interest of the club in these data is but based its rejection on the grounds that releasing the information would run counter to the ladies' interests.

Says Walter Kremer: "The ladies will be sorry ... I'm one hundred per cent sure of that." *Hasso Ziegler*

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 20 August 1981)

Remarks on TV get award winner into hot water

Steps are being taken to withdraw a medal for civilian service awarded to a social worker earlier this year.

The North Rhine-Westphalian government has recommended the action against a 76-year-old woman who has spent years helping prisoners serving life sentences.

The award is the Federal Order of Merit which has been presented about 110,000 times since it was re-introduced 30 years ago by the then President, Theodor Heuss.

If Frau Josefine Jürgens is relieved of the honour, she will be the first.

The problem arises out of a television interview she gave in which she made remarks about Jews in relation to the Majdanek concentration camp trial which ended this year.

Frau Jürgens' answers on the programme "just did not fit in our political landscape and were harmful to the prestige the order enjoys," as an official at the President's Office put it.

The office is in charge of the award's administration.

The subject of the interview was the Majdanek concentration camp trial involving the murder of at least 200,000 between 1942 and 1944.

Frau Jürgens had been looking after one of the accused, former SS officer Hermine Ryan, who was subsequently given the only life term in the trial for the murder of prisoners.

The "Prisoners' Angel" gave Frau Ryan sweet and refreshments and generally stood by her.

In the TV programme, Frau Jürgens made some critical remarks about the conduct of the trial, saying: "I don't know what to believe any more since attending the Majdanek trial. There were so many lies and so many people perjured themselves."

Asked whether this referred to the witnesses, Frau Jürgens answered in the affirmative.

To make matters worse, she said that she had no choice but to assume that Düsseldorf was Communist and Jewish dominated because the press was clearly biased against the accused — which led her to the conclusion that it was time to "rise against the Jews and Communists".

The court itself also came under heavy criticism by Josefine Jürgens. She accused the presiding judge of having permitted "terrorists" to force him to remand Frau Ryan into custody along with three other accused.

The term "terrorist" referred to "Beate Klarsfeld and other Jews and Communists."

And then, to top it all, she said: "This lousy Majdanek trial has made people hate the Jews."

The response to these statements was swift in coming. Only a day later, the Executive Board of the Society for Christian-Jewish Cooperation stripped her of her membership, and the chairman of the Jewish community in Berlin threatened to return his own Order of Merit in protest if Frau Jürgens were permitted to keep hers.

The North Rhine-Westphalian government, which had proposed the award to Frau Jürgens in the first place, recommended that the necessary proceedings to strip her of this honour be started.

It is highly unlikely that Frau Jürgens will hand over the order voluntarily. In fact, when the government in Düsseldorf put out its feelers it found the pugnacious old lady quite adamant.

She made it quite clear that she would fight to retain the order — and how long this can take is anybody's guess.

According to the President's Office, the procedure would have to be based on a decree against which the person concerned can naturally appeal and go through all appeals courts.

But such a court case, which now seems inevitable, could also prove beneficial inasmuch as it would at last clarify the question as to who is worthy of the order.

There has never before been a court ruling on this issue because nobody has tested it.

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 13 August 1981)

A slice of life: no job for woman baker

Hamburger Abendblatt

Patricia Westrich, 26, is the ... woman in the Saar to be ... as a baker.

But she is still not allowed to ... Regulations dating from 1938 say ... no woman can begin work before ...

Since most bakers begin about ... Frau Westrich's three-year apprenticeship would appear to have been ... No baker is prepared to hire her.

There was no law to prevent her ... serving an apprenticeship and ... work at the crack of dawn. The ... regulation that prevents women ... starting work before 6a.m. has ... tions to apprentices doing so if ... helps their vocational training.

Frau Westrich is once more ... something she has experienced ... many times.

She was a school dropout at the ... 14 because all she wanted was to ... her living as soon as possible. Her ... job was in a mechanical engineering ... company as an unskilled worker.

After her election as the youth ... sentative, she ran into problems ... the management and was eventually ... fired.

Her next employer went broke ... subsequently held two other jobs ... was fired shortly before her probation ... period ran out.

She was 20 when she went to the ... bour Office vocational counsellor ... the suggestion that she complete ... schooling, which she did within ... years.

On graduating, she went to the ... bour Office vocational counsellor ... effort to become a locksmith or ... ter or, preferably, a tool and die maker.

But this proved impracticable and ... counsellor in the end convinced her ... her best bet was to train as a baker.

She accepted his advice and ... three-year training period, qualified ... journeyman, becoming the ... first retrained woman baker.

The three-year apprenticeship ... vain and she found herself unemployed ... once more.

She has clearly received wrong ... selling from the Labour Office ... there is no recourse against that.

It took 24 letters to the Labour ... in which Frau Westrich pointed ... her vocational difficulties are due ... Office's misleading advice ... become a trained occupational ... was offered a new apprenticeship ... Nuremberg rehabilitation centre ... handicapped.

If all goes well, Patricia We... be ... by the time she is 30.

She says: "Given the usual ... support by the authorities, I ... manage to go straight from ... ship to old age pension." *Gero G...*

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 13 August ...)

SPORT

How amateurs run all the way to the bank

Stuttgarter Nachrichten

...ateurism is running riot in athletics and the authorities, especially ...AF, are turning a blind eye to the ...

... seasons ago Henry Rono of ... holder of four long-distance ... records, was promoted to a fee of ... per appearance, and he was well ...

...eason there seem to be no more ... whatever to the disregard of amateur ... at international athletics meetings.

...cials whose job it is to root out ...ionalism are working to rule. It ... to be seen at their world contest ... to be held in Rome together with ...ropean Cup, whether they plan to ... the problem seriously.

...teur athletics, the mainstay of the ...pic Games, is fast growing professional. Cash is like water; it always finds ...y.

...s an open secret that a top ... athlete had at least $25,000 ...erred to a Swiss bank account in ... for competing in Zurich.

...s a less well-known fact that the ...highest sum, $5,000, was to be ... to another miler for setting the ... But he turned the offer down, pre... to run for himself.

... promoter Hansen has ambitious plans. In two years he and London promoter Andy Norman, who has Steve Ovett under contract, plan to control the market via contracts with TV companies.

The 11 July Bislett Games were a foretaste of what they have in mind. Seventy-five per cent of the sponsors' cash was to be paid to the superstar (currently Coe or Ovett) and 10 to 15 per cent to the pacemakers.

The rest was for the also-rans, including many famous names. Said Hansen: "They only get $200 to $300 but come all the same. They know they can boost their prospects for other meetings."

He will probably be the first full-time shamateur athletics promoter. Norman is a police officer by profession, yet he organises sports meetings in Budapest, in Australian and in New Zealand.

Organisers of European meetings have set up a lobby with the lofty aim of keeping athletes' demands to within bounds. But they are making no headway whatever.

This is because the governing body, the International Amateur Athletics Federation, is turning a blind eye to practices.

At the European Cup final in Zagreb the main sponsor was a Japanese sportswear manufacturer who paid $500,000 to be optically present at strategic points all over the stadium.

Outgoing IAAF president Adrian Paulen of the Netherlands lamented this was completely against the rules but left it at that. The Yugoslavs got what they wanted: hard convertible cash.

"We have no choice but to follow suit," says Klaus Wolfermann of Puma, the German sportswear manufacturer, whose name is boldly emblazoned on the singlet of athletes under contract.

Renaldo Nehemiah sported the first Puma singlet after setting up a new 110 metres hurdles world record in Zurich.

The leading US trackshoe manufacturer no longer signs season's contracts with athletes. Payouts are made for wins or records at international championships or major meetings only.

So the top-ranking stars take money from both the organiser of the meeting and from sports equipment manufacturers. But if they are out of the running injured, that is it.

Hire and fire methods hold sway. The amateur code no longer counts. It is just a scrap of paper.

The tax authorities are hard on athletes' heels. US moneyspinners are already taxed. They are not yet taxed in Europe, but in Germany the tax offices have started asking to see organisers' books.

But Steve Ovett's was an exceptional case in Lausanne last year, where he had to pay eight per cent tax on his winner's earnings of 15,000 francs to the Swiss canton of Vaud.

The big time is the tacit privilege of a favoured few, however. Discus thrower Werner Hartmann is typical of the average athlete.

He knows what goes on yet says he would happily pay DM100 to take part in Zurich. He is a printer by trade and realises that except at the top, and in the track events not the field, athletics does not pay (in cash). *Robert Hartmann*

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 26 August 1981)



Klaus Ludwig ... high point of career. (Photo: Sven Simon)

Ludwig and his Porsche take the title

Rhinelander Klaus Ludwig, 31, was overjoyed at having clinched the 1981 German motor racing championship in his Porsche.

With two races to go to the end of the season he made sure of his second German championship by winning his ninth race this season.

"This title win is definitely a new high point in my career," said radio and TV mechanic Ludwig.

He is already planning for next season. In addition to the motor racing championship he intends to compete in the works world championship.

He has not yet signed a fresh contract with Ford's of Cologne but feels sure this is only a formality. And he certainly has no plans to retire.

"Why should I?" he asks. "I am still only 31."

For Ford's Erich Zakowski he has this year won nine out of 11 races to make sure of regaining the title he first won in 1979.

Since the German championship was launched in its present form in 1972 he and Hans Heyer have shared the honours. Heyer has most points and Ludwig most wins, 34, to his credit.

He has been racing since 1970 and came third in the overall ratings at his first attempt in the championships seven years ago.

Ludwig, a family man and a keen surfer in his spare time too, has only once tried his hand at another class, Formula 2. That was in 1977.

He was unsuccessful, largely because his car was not the best, and found it hard as a young professional racing driver to get a look-in again among the assembly-line cars.

Even though he won the last race of the 1977 season in the Schnitzer BMW Turbo he had to shell out DM30,000 for his first three races in 1978 as No. 3 driver in the Porsche team run by Georg Loos of Cologne.

But the investment proved worthwhile. In 1979, after having switched to the Kremer brothers, Ludwig was the man of the season.

He and his Porsche showed the opposition a clean pair of radials, winning 10 out of 11 races.

Yet despite the axiom never change a winning team he switched to Ford at the end of that season for a handsome DM150,000 a year. *dpa*

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 28 August 1981)

Authorities 'ignored' drug tests

...fessor Manfred Donike of Cologne ...cuses cycling authorities of ignor... ...ine test findings indicating that ... have taken prohibited drugs.

... should know. Professor Donike, ...mself was a cycling pro for a de... ...runs a laboratory where many ...tests are undertaken.

... claims there have been 16 in... ...s in which no action has been ... on findings he has reported to the ...ties, especially to the UCI, the ... body.

... number of scandalous incidents ...ear make one wonder," he says, ... the UCI's drug rules and the ... they are observed can seriously be ... be any kind of a check in inter... ... cycling any longer."

... feels it is high time the UCI ... its regulations and issued clear ... Otherwise he sees very little ... in the work he does.

... complains that procedural regula... irrelevant to laboratory working ...tions, such as deadlines for the an... ...ment of drug check findings, are ... as pretexts to hush up offences.

... findings that cyclists had taken ...olic steroids have also been ignored, ... on the ground that steroids had ... been expressly banned for the race ...tion.

...et anabolic steroids are on the offi... ...t of UCI-prohibited drugs."

... was surprised to find their use so ...spread (three cases in the samples ... to him from the May Day 1981 ...ger Race), but even more sur... ... to learn that the organisers dis... ... his findings on the pretext men... He also complains that the UCI's medical commission accredits laboratories that lack equipment and experience to ensure satisfactory analysis.

"Accreditation regulations have long ceased to be in keeping with the latest level of scientific knowledge," he says.

Even more alarmingly, he suspects that samples are tampered with: "Despite the tightening-up of checks I have no choice but to come to this conclusion.

"I can hardly fail to do otherwise when samples sent to me contain high nicotine counts for cyclists who are non-smokers and the urine contains high concentrations of softeners and lipids."

Manfred Donike was a member of the German Tour de France team in 1960 and 1961, so he knows what he is talking about.

He says, for instance, that the UCI ought to take urine samples at six-day races and the lucrative criterion events, not just in major tours and the classic events.

"These are events I feel to be particularly drug-prone," he says, "but the UCI refuses to take up my proposal."

So far this year only two drug offenders have been disqualified: Johann van de Velde, winner of the Liège-Bastogne-Liège race, and Jo Maas, winner of the Tour of Belgium.

Both men's samples were analysed by Professor Donike in Cologne. "I really don't set out to catch out the poor devils," he says. "Often enough it isn't their fault. But it's the principle of the matter."

In Belgium, France and Italy the use of prohibited drugs is banned by law, so all cases must be followed up.

His aim is not to discriminate against cycling in particular either. It is one of the few sports that have voluntarily accepted drug checks.

With the stamina it calls for, cycling is particularly in danger, while at the same time many a seeming drug offence is not as serious as it may seem.

There are times when a cyclist must decide whether to abandon a race or a stage or to take powerful drugs to keep a cold under control.

The cases Donike lists in which drug checks were positive but no action was taken are as follows:

- Five cases in the 1980 Tour of Luxembourg, only one of which was acted on.
- Three cases in the 1981 Henninger Race.
- Two cases in the 1980 Tour of Germany.
- One case each in the 1980 and 1981 Giro d'Italia, the 1980 Cologne amateur race, the 1981 Tour of Luxembourg, the 1981 Three-Nations Championship in Luxembourg and the 1981 Tour of Germany.

His laboratory does not check samples taken in the Tour de France, where this year not a single instance of drug findings was reported. *Helmer Boelsen*

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 29 August 1981)